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The Making of Americans, the Teaching of 
English, and the Future of Culture Studies 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
I 
WAS INTERESTED to find that, although "Constitutional Conven- 
tion," "constitutional monarchy," and "Constitution of the United 
States" were three items listed under "What literate Americans 
know" in Professor E. D. Hirsch's provocative book Cultural Literacy, 
the Constitution was not an index entry. In other words, consti- 
tutional matters did not form part of Hirsch's own thinking in the 
making of his argument. There is nothing in his index between 
"Conservatism" and "Constructive Hypothesis."' It is my opinion 
that, if one is going to speak for or plan for that complicated thing 
called an "American," one must think of his or her relationship to 
the Constitution. In this part of my paper, I consider the argument 
of the brilliant reinterpretation of the Constitution in Professor 
Bruce Ackerman's forthcoming book Discover the Constitution.2 
Ackerman's understanding of the Constitution is dualist and ex- 
ceptionalist. The dualism is between normal everyday politics where 
We the People are not much involved, and the great exceptional 
moments in political practice--constitutional politics -where We the 
People are mobilized and involved in the process of change through 
higher lawmaking. 
These involvements of We the People in the law are also man- 
agements of crisis. Although We the People were mobilized at the 
time of Reconstruction, it was the crisis of a possible impeachment 
of the president that brought the Constitutional Amendments. Sim- 
ilarly, in spite of the electoral mobilization of We the People, it was 
the crisis of a possible court-packing that brought in the activist 
welfare state of the New Deal. And the changes, from a federalist 
division of powers, through a nationalist separation of powers, to 
the consolidation of presidential power, were all the time being 
reclaimed into the continuation of normal political practice, where 
We the People are not much involved. In the modern context at 
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least, the electoral mobilization of We the People provides an alibi 
for crisis management among the powers by allowing the party to 
claim "A People's Mandate," while the citizen's political everyday 
life operates without the necessity of her/his participation. 
Thus, for trouble-free normal politics, there must be the gradual 
constitution (small "c"), normalization, regularization of something 
called the People (capital "P") as a collective subject (We), called up 
in times of trouble, in the interest of crisis management. The 
Constitution presupposes a citizenry, and engages in the process of 
popular training of the liberal citizen. And, if you will forgive a 
slightly tendentious phrase, "the ideological state apparatus" does 
work to this end. 
Here, for example, is the making of a collective We the People 
in the high school classroom: 
Mr. Bower's American Government class has been studying the U.S. Con- 
stitution. He has designed a rich multiple-ability groupwork task to help 
his students understand the relationship among the three branches of the 
federal government. To reach his objectives, he wants to challenge the 
students to think metaphorically and to produce insights that allow students 
to use their critical thinking skills .... The task will require many different 
abilities. Some students will have to be good conceptual thinkers; some will 
need to be good artists; at least one person will have to be able to quickly 
find the relevant passages in the Constitution; and someone will need to 
have strong presentation skills. . . [This] example . . . demonstrate[s] the 
advantage of groupwork that may be gained with the proper preparation 
and structure necessary for success.3 
In fact, if not in intent, Mr. Bower is preparing a General Will 
where the word "People," seemingly a referent, is being charged 
with a more and more distanced signification, as actual agency passes 
from the popularly elected House of Commons model to today's 
electoral securing of the noun implicit in the adjective "Popular" 
in "Popular Mandate." If this is to give America back to the people 
in the American way in the high school social sciences class, and if 
the American way is divided into the normal and the constitutional, 
and the high school humanities class is restructuring itself by the 
way of books such as Cultural Literacy, humanities teachers on the 
tertiary level ought perhaps to ask what the cultural politics of the 
production of the "American Way" might be.' I dare to say this 
because an unexamined view of the academic's social task in pre- 
paring a General Will (that would in fact be dormant and uncritical 
in the everyday) is currently laying waste the field of humanistic 
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education-the proper field of the production of something called 
a "People." 
If we move from the techniques of knowledge production to the 
techniques of the electoral securing of the People's Mandate, this 
becomes even clearer. Editorials in all major newspapers have com- 
mented extensively on the fact that, under media management, 
candidates at all levels are becoming detached from local or popular 
constituencies. Jean Baudrillard has called this the electronic pro- 
duction of the "hyper-real," which agencies of power simulate as 
the way things really are. "Simulation" here means declaring the 
existence of something that does not exist. Attention to the details 
of meaning-making might describe the gradual reconstitution of the 
relationship between the People and the Constitution as a spectacular 
and seamless exercise in simulation.5 
Ackerman correctly states that the American origin was not simply 
"an escape from old Feudalism" (de Tocqueville), but a new start. 
Is it banal to remind ourselves that this new start or origin could 
be secured because the colonists encountered a sparsely populated, 
thoroughly precapitalist social formation that could be managed by 
prepolitical maneuvers? Robin Blackburn's recent compendious book 
The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery has argued that the manipulation 
of chattel slavery as an item of political economy was also effective 
in securing a seemingly uninscribed slate in a space effectively cleared 
of political significance in the indigenous population.' 
Since I am an Indian citizen, let me offer you a counternarrative 
of what, in Professor Ackerman's vocabulary, may be called a "failed 
originary moment." "After much hesitation . . . Elizabeth [I] . 
granted a charter of incorporation on December 31st 1600" to the 
East India Company. As is well known, there was increasing conflict 
between the British Government and the Company until, by Pitt's 
India Act of 1784, "the control of the Company was brought under 
the House of Commons."' Of course it is absurd to offer a fable 
as fact, or attempt to rewrite history counterfactually. But let me 
remind you that in the eighteenth century, such great political 
economists as Adam Smith and the British popular press were greatly 
exercised by the failed parallel between the American and Indian 
examples." Let me therefore ask you to imagine that, because the 
East India Company was incorporated, and because India was not 
a sparsely populated, thoroughly precapitalist social formation easily 
handled through prepolitical maneuvers and the manipulation of 
chattel slavery, in other words because it was not possible to establish 
a settlement colony there, no apparent origin could be secured and 
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no Founding Fathers could establish the United States of India, no 
"Indian Revolution" against Britain could be organized by foreign 
settlers. 
I admire the United States greatly, so much so that I have made 
it my second home, lived and worked here over half my life. Speaking 
as a not-quite-not-citizen, then, I would submit to you that Euramer- 
ican origins and foundations are also secured by the sites where an 
"origin" is violently instituted. In the current conjuncture, when so 
much of the identity of the American nation-state is secured by 
global economic and political manipulation, and when the imminent 
prospect of large-scale fence-mending beckons and recedes, it is not 
disrespectful of the energy of We the American People to insist 
that domestic accounts that emphasize America as a self-made giant 
illegally wrenching the origin of freedom from merely a moribund 
Europe and thus displacing the custodians of Western culture have 
their own political agenda. 
In this section of my paper, then, I have made three points: (1) 
The history of higher law-making, the reality of normal politics, 
and changes in electoral mechanics show us that the connection 
between "We the People" and a General Will is constantly negotiable; 
(2) a making of Americans that would be faithful to American 
origins is not just a transaction with Europe; (3) as teachers in the 
humanities, our role in training citizens should not ignore this. 
II 
Like E. D. Hirsch, Jr., I am a teacher of English. I must take 
into account that English is in the world, not just in Britain and 
the United States. Yet, English is the medium and the message 
through which, in education, Americans are most intimately made. 
I entered a department of English as a junior in 1957 in another 
world, in Presidency College at the University of Calcutta. Yet, such 
is the power of epochs or eras that I did not come to the slow 
thinking of other worlds choreographing the march of English until 
about fifteen years ago, when I had already been teaching in the 
United States for about a decade. Thus here too my perspective is 
of the not-quite-not-citizen. 
As such, I must speak from within the debate over the teaching 
of the canon. 
There can be no general theory of canons. Canons are the 
condition of institutions and the effect of institutions. Canons secure 
institutions as institutions ecure canons. The canon as such-those 
books of the Bible accepted as authentic by the Church-provides 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 19:02:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MAKING OF AMERICANS 785 
a clear-cut example. It is within this constraint, then, that some of 
us in the profession are trying to expand the canon. 
Since it is indubitably the case that there is no expansion without 
contraction, we must remove the single author courses from the 
English major curriculum. We must make room for the coordinated 
teaching of the new entries into the canon. When I bring this up, 
I hear stories of how undergraduates have told their teachers that 
a whole semester of Shakespeare, or Milton, or Chaucer, changed 
their lives. I do not doubt these stories, but we have to do a quality/ 
quantity shift if we are going to canonize the new entries. I have 
given something like a general rationale for this expansion in the 
first part of my paper. And, to be consistent with this resolve, even 
the feminist approaches to Shakespeare, the Marxist approaches to 
Milton, and the anti-imperialist approaches to Chaucer (are there 
those?) will have to relinquish the full semester allowed on the 
coattails of the Old Masters of the Canon. The undergraduates will 
have their lives changed perhaps by a sense of the diversity of the 
new canon and the unacknowledged power play involved in securing 
the old. The world has changed too much. The least we can do to 
accept it is to make the small move to push the single author courses 
up into the terminal M.A. 
The matter of the literary canon is in fact a political matter: 
securing authority. In order to secure authority we sometimes have 
to engage in some scrupulous versions of "doctrinaire gesture 
politics."' But, in the double-take that the daily administering of 
that authority entails comes the sense "that there can be no 'knowledge' 
in political practice. . . . Political practice involves the calculation of 
effect, of the possibilities and results of political action, and that 
calculation rests on political relations [in this case within the insti- 
tutional network of United States tertiary education] which condition 
the degrees of certainty of calculation and the range of the 
calculable."'10 
A well-known paragraph in Capital, III, stages this double-take 
impressively. First the tremendous gestures toward the Realm of 
Freedom and the Realm of Necessity, the entire span of the human 
being in Nature and in social action; finally, the brief concluding 
sentence of the range of the calculable: "The reduction of the 
working day is the founding condition [Grundbedingung].""' A model 
for emulation: a lot of gesture politics, talk of other worlds. But 
the reduction of the space and time spent on the old canon is the 
founding condition. 
What comes to fill the released space and time? Even the most 
cursory look at the publishers' catalogues that cross our desks, and 
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the ever-proliferating journals concerned with the matter of the 
countercanon convinces us that there is no shortage of material. 
What I will say will seem to leave out many subtleties of approach. 
But please bear with me, for that is the hazard of all overviews. 
Let me then tabulate the "others," at least keeping in mind that 
the lines cross, under and over one item to another: Women; women 
of color; gays, lesbians; Afro-America; immigrant literature; liter- 
ature of ethnicity; working-class literature; working-class women; 
non-Western literature; and, in peculiar companionship, something 
called "theory."'2 
I am not the only feminist who thinks that the situation of women's 
literature as such is rather particular here. Some women had made 
it into the general canon. "A gentleman's library," wrote H. P. 
Marquand, a thoroughly sexist genteel American novelist writing in 
1958 in his particularly sexist novel Women and Thomas Harrow, "as 
the [small-town, New England, nineteenth century] Judge very well 
understood, comprised the British poets, the works of Bulwer Lytton, 
the Waverley Novels, Dickens and Thackeray, Austen and the Bronte 
sisters and Trollope."'3 We can update this list by at least Virginia 
Woolf and perhaps Edith Wharton. 
With regard to these writers, even more than with the old masters, 
it is a question of restoration to a feminist perspective. But outside 
of this sphere, there were all the certainly-as-good-as-the-men women 
writers who did not get into the canon, as critics like Jane Tompkins 
and Elaine Showalter have shown and inspired other scholars and 
critics to work at showing, because the larger grid of social production 
would not let them in.'" (I am naming recent critics, but of course 
there are hundreds of people to name. The choice is dictated by 
range, time, the limits of my knowledge, and the circle of my 
friends.) 
In this broad sweep, and speaking only from the angle of bursting 
into the canon, how can the institution be obliged to calculate the 
literature of gender-differentiated homosexuality? Only with the 
assumption that, since sexuality-and-sexual-difference is one of the 
main themes and motors of literary production, this literature, in 
its historical determinations, continues to complicate and supplement 
that network, not only by giving us the diverse scoring of "the uses 
of pleasure," but also by showing us how, by the divisive logic of 
normalizing the production of reproductive heterosexuality, we work 
at the continued securing of even the enlarged canon.'5 
Two such different scholars and critics as Gloria Watkins/Bell 
Hooks and Hazel Carby have shown that the moment the color 
black is injected into these calculations, the structures of exclusion 
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that have to be encountered appear much less accessible, much 
more durable.'6 We need an approach here that is more than an 
awareness of the contemporary culture of white supremacy, of the 
fetishization of the black body, of the histories of black heroism in 
the nineteenth century that complete the list. The work on slave 
narratives done by women like Mary Helen Washington and others 
begins to give us a sense of what has been called "the reverse side" 
of the mere "trac[ing] back from images to . . . structure," a tracing 
that constituted the self-representation of the American literary 
canon since its inception."7 By comparison, the restoration and 
insertion of the white-majority feminist canon is a matter of cor- 
recting and altering the established image-structure line of repre- 
sentation as if it restrained the garment of the body politic. With 
the able editorship of Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and others, explosive 
quantities of material for study are being made available. Gates's 
own work, tracing figurations of Africa, takes us out of the strictly 
English canon into the area of culture studies.' 
This literature, the literature of slavery, struggle, freedom, social 
production, is different from the narratives of migrant ethnicity 
inscribed on the body of something called "America." There cannot 
be a general concept of the other that can produce and secure both. 
In the interest of solidarity and gesture politics, we must forget 
these differences. For the painstaking task of training students and 
teachers within the institutional obligation to certify a canon, how- 
ever, we must remember them. 
It seems right that the literature of the working class should form 
a part of disciplinary preparation. Yet in this parade of abstract 
figures on the grid of canonical calculation--woman, gay, 
lesbian, 
black, ethnic-the class-subject is aggressively more abstract as a 
concept. And on that level of abstraction, there may be a contra- 
diction between embattled class consciousness and the American 
Dream. Perhaps in Britain the situation is different; both because 
of its earlier entry into the organized left and its later entry into 
something resembling the American Dream, through Thatcher's 
brilliant maneuvers.'9 One cannot not commend the study of the 
writing of the exploited in struggle. Yet is there something partic- 
ularly disqualifying about "working-class" becoming a canonical de- 
scriptive rather than an oppositional transformative? Certainly the 
basic argument of Jonathan's Rae's Proletarian Philosophers would 
seem to suggest so.20 
This could in fact be the problem with all noncanonical teaching 
in the humanities, an implicit confusion between descriptive canonical 
practices within an institution and transformative practices relating 
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to some "real" world. It is this area of confusion that can be 
depolemicized and made productive, through deconstructive strat- 
egies of teaching. With this in mind, I will soon touch upon the 
need for deconstructive, power/knowledge-based, generally post- 
structuralist, preparation for our faculty. My cautions about the 
undergraduate teaching of poststructuralism relates to the breeding 
of recuperative analogies or preprogrammed hostility toward post- 
structuralism within the institutional calculus. 
Let us, for the moment, avoid this problem and go back to our 
English major, strung tight with the excitement of learning to read 
the diversity of the new canon: a bit of the old masters in new 
perspectives, women's literature, black women's literature, a glimpse 
of Afro-America, the literature of gendered homosexuality, of mi- 
grant ethnicity, of the exploited in struggle. 
We are taking good teaching for granted, a teaching that can 
make the student grasp that this is a canon, that this is the proper 
object of study of the new English major. Teaching is a different 
matter from our list of ingredients.2 The proof of the pudding is 
in the classroom. And, as I will say again, pedagogy talk is different 
from conference talk. Let us then return to our well-taught un- 
dergraduate and look at the last two items on our list: theory, and 
the literature of the rest of the world. 
Theory in the United States institution of the profession of English 
is often shorthand for the general critique of humanism undertaken 
in France in the wake of the Second World War and then, in a 
double-take, further radicalized in the mid-sixties in the work of 
the so-called poststructuralists. I believe this material has no claim 
to a separate enclave in our undergraduate major.22 
(This remark is not as dire as it sounds. It is because I am 
confident of the practical possibilities of the critique of humanism 
that I am cautious about using it too soon as more than a pedagogic 
method, or as a pervasive and foregrounded structural topic of 
discussion. I am not discouraging theoretical teaching, or even an 
integration of theory into the general approach, on the under- 
graduate level.) 
The critique of humanism in France was related to the perceived 
failure of the European ethical subject after the war. The second 
wave in the mid-sixties, coming in the wake of the Algerian revo- 
lution, sharpened this in terms of disciplinary practice in the hu- 
manities and social sciences because, as historians, philosophers, 
sociologists, and psychologists, the participants felt that their practice 
was not merely a disinterested pursuit of knowledge, but productive 
in the making of human beings. It was because of this that they 
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did not accept unexamined human experience as the source of 
meaning and the making of meaning as an unproblematic thing. 
And each one of them offered a method that would challenge the 
outlines of a discipline: archaeology, genealogy, power/knowledge 
reading, schizo-analysis, rhizo-analysis, nonsubjective psychoanalysis, 
affirmative deconstruction, paralogic legitimation. At the end of the 
Second World War, the self-representation of the United States, on 
the other hand, was that of a savior, both militarily and, as the 
architect of the Marshall Plan, in the economic and therefore so- 
ciocultural sphere. In fact, given the nature of United States society, 
the phrase "failure of the ethical subject felt by humanist intellectuals" 
has almost no meaning. And, given the ego-based pragmatism in 
the fields of history, philosophy, sociology, psychology and, indeed, 
literary criticism in the United States, the majority of United States 
teachers in the humanities saw and see the relevant French intel- 
lectuals as merely being antihumanists who believe that there is no 
human subject and no truth. As Pierre Bourdieu makes clear in 
his Homo Academicus, these intellectuals did not have an impact on 
the protocols of institutional pedagogy in France either.23 I think 
therefore it is absurd to expect our undergraduate majors to clue 
into this package called "theory" as part of the canon. There is 
often a required History of Criticism course for them. I suppose 
the impact of "theory" in literary criticism can find a corner there.24 
If they can understand Plato against the poets, or Coleridge on the 
Imagination, and Freud on Hoffmann, they can understand Barbara 
Johnson on Poe. And the critique of the subject that they can learn 
from the countercanonical new material is that the old canon con- 
spired often unwittingly to make the straight white Christian man 
of property the ethical universal. 
Because the use of what is called "theory" is in "educating the 
educators," it is the doctoral student-the future teacher-who can 
be carefully inserted into it. And although I see no harm in intro- 
ductory courses in theory on this level, I feel its real arena is an 
elected sequence, where interested students are prepared to resonate 
with something so much outside their own thoroughly pragmatic 
national tradition. By "preparation" I do not mean just chunks of 
Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger. I mean practice in analyzing 
critical prose. I have no experience in long-term teaching at elite 
institutions. In my experience doctoral students in English are 
generally encouraged to judge without preparation. This is lethal 
in the critique of the canon, and doubly so in the study of so-called 
"theory," for the practitioners there are writers of historical, socio- 
logical, philosophical, psychological prose who rely on rhetoric to 
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help them. These students must also take seriously their foreign 
language requirement, which is generally a scandal. The intellectual- 
historical difference between Western Europe and the Anglo-United 
States in the post-War and Cold War years and indeed the difference 
in the fate of liberal humanism in these spaces is such that the most 
conscientious translators have often destroyed and indeed trivialized 
the delicacy as well as the power of the critique, not knowing what 
to preserve. 
These students must learn that it is possible to be "wrong" on a 
certain restrictive level and take that as an incentive for further 
inquiry. I know the bumper sticker says "Kids need praise everyday," 
but doctoral students, who are going to reproduce cognitive authority 
soon, might be encouraged to recognize that acknowledgement of 
error before texts from another tradition need not be disabling or 
paralyzing. I emphasize this because here we are attempting not 
merely to enlarge the canon with a countercanon but to dethrone 
canonical method: not only in literary criticism but in social pro- 
duction; the axiom that something called concrete experience is the 
last instance. The canon is, after all, not merely the authentic books 
of the Bible, it is also, the OED tells us, "a fundamental principle 
. . . or axiom governing the systematic or scientific treatment of a 
subject." Why is it necessary to gut the canon in this way? I hope 
to touch upon it in my last section. But I also hope that those 
students in the doctoral stream who choose to follow this counter- 
intuitive route will acquire some notion of its usefulness. 
I have kept the rest of the world till the end. I think a cursory 
acquaintance with world literature outside of Euramerica should be 
part of the general undergraduate requirement. On the level of 
the English major, especially if we keep the single-author courses, 
a survey course is an insult to world literature. I would propose a 
one-semester senior seminar, shared with the terminal M.A., utilizing 
the resources of the Asian, Latin American, Pacific, and African 
studies, in conjunction with the creative writing programs, where 
the student is made to share the difficulties and triumphs of trans- 
lation. There is nothing that would fill out an English major better 
than a sense of the limits of this exquisite and supple language. 
The division between substantive expansion of the canon and a 
critique of canonical method is most rigorously to be kept in mind 
in world literature studies on the graduate level: colonial and post- 
colonial discourse, studies in a critique of imperialism. As long as 
this line of work is critical of the canon it can remain conscientiously 
researched straight English: Laura Brown's work with Swift and 
Gauri Viswanathan's on T. S. Eliot come to mind. One can think 
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of the role of the navy in Jane Austen's Persuasion, or of Christianity 
in Othello, and so on. But as soon as it becomes a substantive insertion 
into the canon, we should call a halt. 
There has been a recent spate of jobs opening up in the anglo- 
phone literature of the Third World. This is to be applauded. But 
the doctoral study of colonial and postcolonial discourse and the 
critique of imperialism as a substantive undertaking cannot be con- 
tained within English. In my thinking, this study should yoke itself 
with other disciplines, including the social sciences, so that we have 
degrees in English and history, English and Asian studies, English 
and anthropology, English and African studies, where the English 
half of it will allow the student to read critically the production of 
knowledge in the other discipline, as well as her own all-too-easy 
conclusions. Mutatis mutandis, metropolitan national literature de- 
partments can also serve as bases. 
I think this specialty should carry a rigorous language requirement 
in at least one colonized vernacular. What I am describing is the 
core of a transnational study of culture, a revision of the old vision 
of Comparative Literature. Otherwise: 
Colonial and postcolonial discourse studies can, at worst, allow 
the indigenous elite from other countries to claim marginality without 
any developed doctoral-level sense of the problematic of decolonized 
space and without any method of proper verification within the 
discipline. 
If this study is contained within English (or other metropolitan 
literatures), without expansion into fully developed transnational 
culture studies, colonial and postcolonial discourse studies can also 
construct a canon of "Third World Literature (in translation)" that 
may lead to a "new orientalism." I have written about this phe- 
nomenon at length elsewhere.25 It can fix Eurocentric paradigms, 
taking "magical realism" to be the trademark of Third World literary 
production, for example. It can begin to define "the rest of the 
world" simply by checking out if it is feeling sufficiently "marginal" 
with regard to the West or not. 
We cannot fight imperialism by perpetrating a "new orientalism." 
My argument is not a guilt and shame trip. It is a warning. Indeed, 
the institutional imperatives for breaching the very imperium of 
English, even with its revised canon, cannot be developed from 
within English departments, for in its highly sophisticated vocabulary 
for cultural descriptions, the knowledge of English can sometimes 
sanction a kind of global ignorance. 
Here is a rationalist empiricist historian's warning, sounded nearly 
a decade ago, against what we might be doing now: "Any serious 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 19:02:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
792 NEW LITERARY HISTORY 
theoretical explanation of the historical field outside of feudal Europe 
will have to supersede traditional and generic contrasts with it, and 
proceed to a concrete and accurate typology of social formations 
and State systems in their own right, which respects their very great 
differences of structure and development. It is merely in the night 
of our ignorance [and we sanction this ignorance by canonizing it 
within English] that all alien shapes take on the same hue."26 
III 
Arrived here, it seems to me that institutes and curricula for the 
transnational study of culture have become an item on the agenda. 
They can help us undo disciplinary boundaries and clear a space 
for study in a constructive way. They can provide the field for the 
new approach. 
The point is to negotiate between the national, the global, and 
the historical as well as the contemporary diasporic. We must both 
anthropologize the West, and study the various cultural systems of 
Africa, Asia, Asia-Pacific, and the Americas as if peopled by historical 
agents. Only then can we begin to put together the story of the 
development of a cosmopolitanism that is global, gendered, and 
dynamic. In our telematic or microelectronic world, such work can 
get quite technical: consideration of the broader strategies of in- 
formation control, productive of satisfactory and efficient cultural 
explanations; consideration of the systems of representation for the 
generated explanations; mapping out the techniques of their vali- 
dation and deployment. This can disclose an inexhaustible field of 
connections. A discipline must constrain the inexhaustible. Yet the 
awareness of the potential inexhaustibility works against the con- 
viction of cultural supremacy, a poor starting point for new research 
and teaching. 
This last paragraph is grant proposal talk. How does that type 
of prose translate to teaching talk? Let us move from high tech to 
humanism. Let us learn and teach how to distinguish between 
"internal colonization"--the patterns of exploitation and domination 
of disenfranchised groups within the United States-and the various 
different heritages or operations of colonization in the rest of the 
world.27 The United States is certainly a multiracial culture, but its 
parochial multicultural debates, however animated, are not a picture 
of globality. Thus we must negotiate between nationalism (uni- or 
multicultural) and globality. 
Let us take seriously the idea that systems of representation come 
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to hand when we secure our own culture-our own cultural ex- 
planations. Think upon the following set: 
(1) The making of an American must be defined by at least a 
desire to enter the "We the People" of the Constitution. There is 
no way that the "radical" or the "ethnicist" can take a position 
against civil rights, the Equal Rights Amendment, or great trans- 
formative opinions such as Roe v. Wade. One way or another, we 
cannot not want to inhabit this great rational abstraction. 
(2) Traditionally, this desire for the abstract American "we" has 
been recoded by the fabrication of ethnic enclaves, artificial and 
affectively supportive subsocieties that, claiming to preserve the 
ethnos or culture of origin, move further and further away from 
the vicissitudes and transformations of the nation or group of origin. 
If a constitution establishes at least the legal possibility of an abstract 
collectivity, these enclaves provide a countercollectivity that seems 
reassuringly "concrete." 
(3) Our inclination to obliterate the difference between United 
States internal colonization and the dynamics of decolonized space 
makes use of this already established American ethnocultural agenda. 
At worst, it secures the "they" of development or aggression against 
the constitutional "we." At best, it suits our institutional convenience 
and brings the rest of the world home. A certain double standard, 
a certain sanctioned ignorance, can now begin to operate in the 
areas of the study of central and so-called marginal cultures. 
There is a lot of name-calling on both sides of the West-and-the- 
rest debate in the United States. In my estimation, although the 
politics of the only-the-West supporters is generally worth ques- 
tioning, in effect the two sides legitimize each other. In a Foucauldian 
language, one could call them an opposition within the same dis- 
cursive formation. The new culture studies must displace this op- 
position by keeping nation and globe distinct, and by taking a 
moratorium on cultural supremacy as an unquestioned springboard. 
I am not speaking against the tendency to conflate ethnos of 
origin and the historical space left behind, within the astonishing 
construction of a multicultural and multiracial identity for the United 
States. What I am suggesting is that if, as academics in the humanities, 
we take this as the founding principle for a study of globality, then 
we are off base. In the most practical terms, we are allowing a 
parochial decanonization debate to stand in for a study of the world. 
A slightly different point needs to be made here. I am not arguing 
for an unexamined nativism as an alibi for culture studies. To keep 
the rest of the world obliged to remain confined within a mere 
ethnic pride and an acting out of a basically static ethnicity is to 
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confuse political gestures with an awareness of history. That con- 
finement was rather astutely practiced by the traditionally defined 
disciplinary subdivision of labor within history, anthropology, and 
comparative literature. Culture studies must set up an active give- 
and-take with them so that it gains in substance what it provides 
in method. And, the educators must educate themselves in effective 
interdisciplinary (postdisciplinary?) teaching. As a practical academic, 
one must be thinking about released time for faculty and curricular 
development in the newly instituted programs. These endeavors 
must ask: How can models of reasoning be taken as culture-free? 
How can help and explanation be both culture specific and "ob- 
jective?" If there are answers to these questions, how can they 
remain relevant across disciplines? 
IV 
In conclusion, I will try to indicate how deconstruction, feminism, 
and Marxism might make a change in the teaching of transnational 
culture studies. 
Deconstruction: Postcoloniality-the heritage of imperialism in the 
rest of the globe-is a deconstructive case. As follows: Those of us 
from formerly colonized countries are able to communicate with 
each other and with the metropolis, to exchange and to establish 
sociality and transnationality, because we have had access to the 
culture of imperialism. Shall we then assign to that culture, in the 
words of the ethical philosopher Bernard Williams, a measure of 
"moral luck?"28 I think there can be no doubt that the answer is 
"no." This impossible "no" to a structure, which one critiques, yet 
inhabits intimately, is the deconstructive philosophical position, and 
the everyday here and now of "postcoloniality" is a case of it. Further, 
the political claims that are most urgent in decolonized space are 
tacitly recognized as coded within the legacy of imperialism: na- 
tionhood, constitutionality, citizenship, democracy, socialism, even 
culturalism. Within the historical frame of exploration, colonization, 
and decolonization, what is being effectively reclaimed is a series of 
regulative political concepts, the supposedly authoritative narrative 
of whose production was written elsewhere, in the social formations 
of Western Europe. They are thus being reclaimed, indeed claimed, 
as concept metaphors for which no historically adequate referent may 
be advanced from postcolonial space. That does not make the claims 
less urgent. A concept metaphor without an adequate referent may 
be called a catachresis by the definitions of classical rhetoric. These 
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claims to catachreses as foundations also make postcoloniality a 
deconstructive case. Deconstruction, paradoxically, is the most useful 
position in the study of a globality not confused with ethnicity. 
Feminism: In a provocative sentence in "The Laugh of the Medusa," 
Helene Cixous writes, "as subject for history, woman always occurs 
simultaneously in several places."29 This gendered subject makes 
visible what, in the old figurations of the pluralized woman (as 
mother, wife, sister, daughter, widow, female chattel, whore, excep- 
tional stateswoman, or public woman with femininity recoded, and 
so on), was excluded as historical narratives were shored up, in 
many different ways, with the representative man as their subject. 
At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that the best and 
the worst in the history of the feminist movement also entails the 
presentation of woman as unified representative subject. In this 
divided terrain, as woman is normalized into the definition of "We 
the People," through the operation of both the guaranteed instru- 
ments, both, that is to say, "transformative opinions" and "consti- 
tutional amendments," both Roe v. Wade and the ERA, how are we 
to deal with this defining of ourselves into part of a general will 
by way of articles of "foreign"--that is to say, gender-alienated- 
manufacture? United States women, if they are attentive to the 
importance of frame narratives, are in a unique and privileged 
position to continue a persistent critique of mere apologists for the 
Constitution, even as they use its instruments to secure entry into 
its liberating purview. Persistently to critique a structure that one 
cannot not (wish to) inhabit is the deconstructive stance.30 
Such a strong autocritique, will, I hope, be able to take a clear 
look, once again, at the relationship between nationalism and glob- 
ality in this sphere. It is through the route of feminism that economic 
theories of social choice and philosophical theories of ethical pref- 
erence can be complicated by real cultural material. 
Marxism: By Marx's own estimation, the most original thing that 
he stumbled upon was that the human being produced not objects 
but a "contentless and simple" thing which got coded as soon as 
produced.31 This contentless thing, misleading and conveniently 
called "value," is not pure form, but just a general description of 
being human that subsumes "consciousness" and "materiality." The 
coding of value makes all exchange possible. In the European 
nineteenth century and for Marx, the most important arena of 
value-coding for study and action was economic. But if one considers 
one of Marx's most important premises, one can see that this idea 
of value-producing/value-coding/code-exchanging as being-human 
has many areas of operation. To "name" a few: affective value, 
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cognitive value, indeed "cultural" value. To see this allows us to 
negotiate escapes from fairly static notions of cultural identity ready 
to be investigated and reported on. It allows us to use and transform 
some of the best suggestions of poststructuralism and feminism. It 
allows us to transform what is most fragile in Marx-and indeed 
crumbling daily at the moment-the predictive Eurocentric scenario, 
buttressed only by a spectacular scaffolding of crisis theory and the 
theory of a world market far in the future. 
Marx's fully developed economic analysis is situated within this 
more inclusive approach. It would be out of place-and time-here 
to present a full-dress account of the responsible displacement of 
the "economic in the last instance" to the "economic as the most 
abstract instance" in the complex network of value codings. Let me 
rather end with a heavily coded sentence: As the apparatuses of 
higher education in the humanities incessantly recode, through fully 
developed techniques of knowledge, the web woven by the rational 
(dynamic) abstractions of the constitutionality of the world's nation 
states on the one hand and the electronic (mathematical) abstractions 
of the economic as such on the other, a responsible study of culture 
can help us chart the production of versions of reality. 
Such heavily coded sentences are properly unpacked in books, 
practically reassembled in teaching. Indeed, the hoped-for future 
of everything written in the name of culture studies today must, I 
think, be the classroom staged as intervention, too painfully aware 
of its limits to dream only of integration. 
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